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In State v. Christensen,1 the Tennessee Supreme 
Court decided whether police officers violated the 
defendant’s constitutional right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures when the officers entered the 
defendant’s property despite the presence of “No 
Trespassing” signs. The court ruled that the officers’ 
entrance did not constitute a violation of the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.2 Thus, the court upheld the ruling 
of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, stating that 
“No Trespassing” signs, alone, do not prohibit officers 
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1 517 S.W.3d 60, 68–69 (Tenn. 2017). 
2 Id. at 63–64. 
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from coming onto the curtilage of a home to conduct a 
consensual knock-and-talk encounter. Therefore, the 
ruling by the trial court, finding the defendant guilty, 
was upheld.3  
 On August 3, 2013, two narcotics investigators 
responded to a tip regarding a pseudoephedrine 
purchase.4 The tip eventually led them to the defendant’s 
home, which had a gravel driveway.5 Two “No 
Trespassing” signs were posted at the entrance to the 
driveway.6 Further, there were no physical obstructions 
preventing entrance to the driveway.7 The defendant 
came out to meet the investigators as they approached 
his porch.8 When the defendant opened the door, the 
investigators smelled the distinct odor that comes with 
the production of methamphetamine.9 The officers then 
spoke to the defendant and asked for consent to search 
his home.10 The defendant told the investigators that he 
had done nothing illegal and would not consent to the 
search.11 At this point, the investigators determined that, 
due to the present exigent circumstances (namely the 
volatile nature of the chemicals used in 
methamphetamine production), they had to enter the 
home to investigate further.12 One investigator forced 
open the locked door to the home and began searching.13 
This initial entry led to the discovery of a 
methamphetamine lab and several firearms.14  
                                               
3 Id. at 79. 
4 Id. at 64. 
5 Id. at 65. 
6 Id. at 67. 
7 Id. at 64. 
8 Id. at 65. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 66. 
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At trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence gathered as a result of the warrantless 
search of his home, claiming that the presence of a “No 
Trespassing” sign meant that a warrant was required to 
enter his property.15 The defendant’s motion was denied 
and he was convicted of five separate criminal charges.16 
Later, on direct appeal, the defendant contended that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the 
evidence found within his home.17 Conducting de novo 
review, the court of appeals determined that the growing 
legal consensus was that “the implied invitation of the 
front door can be revoked but that the revocation must be 
obvious to the casual visitor who wishes only to contact 
the residents of a property.”18 Based on this 
determination, the court of appeals found the presence of 
a mere “No Trespassing” sign insufficient to revoke any 
aforementioned implied invitation.19 
 On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court began 
its review by affirming the rights enshrined in the federal 
and state constitutions forbidding warrantless searches 
of homes and specific Fourth Amendment protections 
against searches on the curtilage of one’s home.20 The 
court pointed out, however, that not every police 
interaction on the curtilage of one’s home constitutes a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.21 Citing the U.S. 
                                               
15 State v. Christensen, No. W2014-00931-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 
Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 357, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 
2015). 
16 Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 63. 
17 Christensen, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 357, at *7. 
18 Id. at *13 (citing State v. Grice, 767 S.E.2d 312, 319 (N.C. 
2015)). 
19 Id. 
20 Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 68–69 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. 
IV; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 7). The court here “assume[d][] 
without deciding” that the driveway was part of the curtilage 
of the defendant’s home. Id. at 69. 
21 Id. at 69. 
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Supreme Court’s ruling in Florida v. Jardines,22 the court 
recognized the right of police officers to approach the 
curtilage of a home under “knock-and-talk” rules.23 It was 
further established that “knock-and-talk” interactions 
are not considered searches under the Fourth 
Amendment; therefore, the question became whether the 
defendant had revoked this implied invitation to “knock-
and-talk.”24  
 The issue of whether “No Trespassing” signs are 
enough to revoke any implied license to “knock-and-talk” 
has been the subject of many state and federal cases.25 
However, the majority of states have found that such 
signs were not enough revoke an implied license to 
“knock-and-talk.”26 The court specifically noted State v. 
Rigoulot,27 which stated that “No Trespassing” signs 
“cannot reasonably be interpreted to exclude normal, 
legitimate inquiries.”28 In order to determine when a “No 
Trespassing” sign may be reasonably interpreted to 
forbid “knock-and-talk” situations, the court turned to 
the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Carloss.29 The 
court specifically pointed to a concurring opinion in 
Carloss, in which Chief Judge Tymkovich said that the 
                                               
22 Id. at 69–70 (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 
1415–16 (2013) (holding that while police officers have a 
license to approach the home and knock, if they are engaging 
in conduct that is clearly a search, around the curtilage, any 
such evidence gathered as a result should be suppressed)). 
23 Id. at 70 (citing State v. Cothran, 115 S.W.3d 513, 522 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 2003)). 
24 Id. (citing Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417–18). 
25 Id. at 72 (citing cases). 
26 Id. at 73 (citing cases). 
27 846 P.2d 918, 923 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (stating that “No 
Trespassing” signs are not enough to forbid normal legitimate 
requests, and that police officers do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment if they enter the curtilage under these 
circumstances). 
28 Id. at 923. 
29 818 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 2016).  
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legal standard to be applied in these cases should be 
whether a reasonable person, under a totality of the 
circumstances, would view a “No Trespassing” sign as 
something that would place any bearing on one’s ability 
to go up to the curtilage of the home and knock.30 The 
Tennessee Supreme Court adopted this totality of the 
circumstances standard.31 In examining the totality of 
the circumstances in the defendant’s case, the court 
determined that the simple presence of  “No Trespassing” 
signs did not suffice to deter officers from approaching 
the curtilage of his home.32 The court suggested, however, 
that if the defendant’s driveway had been blocked by a 
locked gate or a fence, then it would have been more clear 
to the officers that any license to approach the home had 
been revoked.33 No such barrier existed in the 
defendant’s case.34 Based on this determination, the 
court found that the defendant had no expectation of 
privacy in regards to individuals approaching his home.35  
Thus, the ruling of the trial court was upheld.36 
 The dissent rebuffed the court’s assertion that it 
might take a locked fence or gate for a citizen to invoke 
his Fourth Amendment rights.37 In writing the dissent, 
Justice Sharon Lee pointed out that the court’s physical 
barriers standard would leave poorer citizens without the 
means to invoke their rights.38 Justice Lee further stated 
that “No Trespassing” signs clearly state the property 
owner’s desire to not have visitors.39 Many other 
                                               
30 Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 74–75 (citing Carloss, 818 F.3d 
at 999–1000). 
31 Id. at 75. 
32 Id. at 75–76. 
33 Id. at 78–79. 
34 Id. at 76–77. 
35 Id. at 78. 
36 Id. at 79. 
37 Id. (Lee, J., dissenting). 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 80. 
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jurisdictions have taken such a stance.40 One such 
example is People v. Scott,41 where the New York Court of 
Appeals declared that physical barriers and/or 
appropriate signage was enough to make clear that entry 
was not permitted by the property owner.42 However, the 
dissent also considered the totality of the circumstances 
standard set forth by the court.43 Justice Lee contended 
that, even under the totality of the circumstances 
standard, the defendant made it clear that he wanted no 
visitors.44 Justice Lee argued that while the majority 
claimed it was applying a totality of the circumstances 
standard, it failed to actually weigh the significance of 
the signs.45 Citing a case from the Maryland Court of 
Appeals, Justice Lee contended that the presence of two 
clearly visible “No Trespassing” signs was enough to 
make it clear to the investigators that no one was 
welcome to approach the home.46 Justice Lee also argued 
that because the defendant had made clear that no one 
was welcome on his property, he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy on his curtilage, and those 
expectations were violated by the warrantless intrusion 
by the investigators.47 
 Christensen will have an effect on homeowners 
across the state of Tennessee by raising the bar for what 
revokes the implied invitation for individuals to approach 
the curtilage of their home and knock. Now, Tennesseans 
must utilize a physical barrier, such as a locked fence or 
gate, to put the public on notice that unsolicited visitors 
are not welcome to approach their home. While this 
                                               
40 See, e.g., id. at 80–81 (citing cases). 
41 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1338 (N.Y. 1992). 
42 Id.  
43 Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 82 (Lee, J., dissenting). 
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Id. (citing Jones v. State, 943 A.2d 1, 12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2008)). 
47 Id. at 83. 
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ruling follows most other jurisdictions in making physical 
barriers the standard for revocation of the implied 
invitation to “knock-and-talk,” it still leaves some 
questions. One such question is whether such a rule will 
create a burden on lower income households that wish to 
invoke their Fourth Amendment rights.48 It will be 
important to follow future cases to see if there are any 
disparities based on income. Another question is how 
other courts will treat the varying rulings taken by 
jurisdictions on this issue. While most jurisdictions have 
adopted the same rule as Tennessee, others have chosen 
the alternative.49 Until there is a significant divergence 
on this issue in the federal courts, however, this area of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will likely remain one 
governed by jurisdiction-specific rules. 
 
 
 
                                               
48 See id. at 79. 
49 Id. at 80. 
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